fbpx

09/06/2016

9
Jun

«Πράσινο φως» από το EWG για την εκταμίευση της δόσης

«Πράσινο φως» από το EWG για την εκταμίευση της δόσης των 7,5 δισ. ευρώ στην Ελλάδα άναψε το βράδυ της Πέμπτης το EuroWorking Group (EWG), δηλαδή οι τεχνοκράτες των χωρών της Eυρωζώνης, εκτιμώντας ότι η κυβέρνηση εκπλήρωσε τα προαπαιτούμενα και συνεπώς ολοκληρώθηκε η πρώτη αξιολόγηση του ελληνικού προγράμματος.
Η σκυτάλη τώρα περνά στα κοινοβούλια ορισμένων χωρών της Ευρωζώνης, τα οποία καλούνται με τη σειρά τους να επικυρώσουν τη συμφωνία, μια διαδικασία που θεωρείται πλέον τυπικού χαρακτήρα.
Η απόφαση για την εκταμίευση των χρημάτων θα ληφθεί στις 16 Ιουνίου στο Λουξεμβούργο, από το δ.σ. του Ευρωπαϊκού Μηχανισμού Σταθερότητας (ΕΜΣ).

Πηγή : link

9
Jun

Μοσκοβισί: Είμαι βέβαιος ότι στο επόμενο Eurogroup θα αποφασίσουμε την εκταμίευση των 10,3 δισ.

Μοσκοβισί: Είμαι βέβαιος ότι στο επόμενο Eurogroup θα αποφασίσουμε την εκταμίευση των 10,3 δισ.Τη βεβαιότητα του ότι στο επόμενο Eurogroup θα αποφασιστεί η εκταμίευση της επόμενης δόσης του ελληνικού προγράμματος εξέφρασε ο επίτροπος Οικονομικών υποθέσεων, Πιερ Μοσκοβισί, σε δήλωσή του στο ΑΠΕ-ΜΠΕ.

Ο Π. Μοσκοβισί ο οποίος συμμετείχε σε πάνελ συζήτησης για τις διαρθρωτικές μεταρρυθμίσεις μαζί με τον Έλληνα υπουργό Οικονομικών, Ευκλείδη Τσακαλώτο, στο πλαίσιο του Brussels Economic Forum στις Βρυξέλλες, ανέφερε πως η σημερινή συνεδρίαση του EuroWorking Group θα εξετάσει την πορεία εφαρμογής των προαπαιτούμενων και θα επικυρώσει τις συζητήσεις που έχουν ήδη λάβει χώρα.

«Είμαι βέβαιος ότι η δουλειά που έχει γίνει θα αποδώσει καρπούς και την επόμενη εβδομάδα στο Eurogroup στο Λουξεμβούργο θα είμαστε σε θέση να αποφασίσουμε την εκταμίευση των 10,3 δισ. για την Ελλάδα από τα οποία τα 7,5 δισ. θα δοθούν άμεσα» υπογράμμισε ο Π. Μοσκοβισί, συμπληρώνοντας πως «ένα πολύ σημαντικό βήμα» προς αυτήν την κατεύθυνση έγινε στο προηγούμενο Eurogroup.

«Από τότε εργαζόμαστε σοβαρά και με θετικό τρόπο για να λύσουμε όποια προβλήματα υπάρχουν, το ένα μετά το άλλο. Πιστεύω ότι είμαστε πολύ κοντά στο να τα καταφέρουμε», επισήμανε ο Γάλλος επίτροπος, εκφράζοντας την πεποίθηση πως την επόμενη εβδομάδα θα γίνει ένα «καλό» Eurogroup το οποίο θα είναι σε θέση να «επιβεβαιώσει ότι οι μεταρρυθμίσεις προχωράνε στην Ελλάδα».

Αναφορικά με την επικείμενη εκταμίευση των 7,5 δισ., σημείωσε ότι θα αποτελέσει μια «πραγματική πηγή οξυγόνου» την οποία έχει ανάγκη η ελληνική οικονομία, καθώς ο σκοπός παραμένει «η επιστροφή της ανάπτυξης, η εμπιστοσύνη των επενδυτών, η δημιουργία θέσεων εργασίας».

Τέλος, αναφέρθηκε και στις προβλέψεις της Κομισιόν για το μέλλον της ελληνικής οικονομίας, στις οποίες καταγράφεται «επιστροφή της ανάπτυξης το δεύτερο εξάμηνο του έτους, και ανάπτυξη κοντά στο 3% την επόμενη χρονιά». « Όλα αυτά βέβαια είναι υποθέσεις που στηρίζονται στην επιτυχία του προγράμματος» κατέληξε ο Επίτροπος Οικονομικών υποθέσεων.

Πηγή : link

9
Jun

Αυξημένη η επιβατική κίνηση στα αεροδρόμια το α’ πεντάμηνο του 2016

Αυξημένη η επιβατική κίνηση στα αεροδρόμια το α’ πεντάμηνο του 2016.Αύξηση 10,3% παρουσίασε ο συνολικός αριθμός των διακινηθέντων επιβατών το πρώτο πεντάμηνο του 2016, σε σχέση με το αντίστοιχο διάστημα του 2015, φθάνοντας τα 13,6 εκατ. έναντι 12,3 εκατ. επιβατών πέρυσι στο α’ πεντάμηνο.

Σύμφωνα με τα στοιχεία της Υπηρεσίας Πολιτικής Αεροπορίας, ο συνολικός αριθμός των πτήσεων στα ελληνικά αεροδρόμια το α΄ πεντάμηνο το έτους έφθασε τις 134.305 (από τις οποίες 70.372 εσωτερικού και 63.933 εξωτερικού), παρουσιάζοντας αύξηση 5,3% (+6,6% στις πτήσεις εσωτερικού και +4,0 % στις πτήσεις εξωτερικού), σε σχέση με το αντίστοιχο διάστημα του 2015 όπου είχαν πραγματοποιηθεί 127.517 πτήσεις.

Αναλυτικότερα, ο συνολικός αριθμός των διακινηθέντων επιβατών το πεντάμηνο του 2016 έφθασε τα 13.597.700 έναντι 12.325.554 στο αντίστοιχο διάστημα το 2015.

 

Πηγή:link

9
Jun

Αυτοί είναι οι 125 συμμετέχοντες στη λέσχη Μπίλντερμπεργκ

Αυτοί είναι οι 125 συμμετέχοντες στη λέσχη Μπίλντερμπεργκ.Στη Δρέσδη συνεδριάζει την Πέμπτη η Λέσχη Μπίλντερμπεργκ με ισχυρές συμμετοχές από την παγκόσμια πολιτική, οικονομική και επιχειρηματική ελίτ.

Στη συνάντηση θα μετέχουν 125 άτομα, μεταξύ αυτών και τρείς Έλληνες. Πρόκειται για τους:

-Γιώργο Λογοθέτη, Πρόεδρο και Διευθύνοντα Σύμβουλο της  Libra Group

-Κυριάκο Μητσοτάκη, Πρόεδρο της ΝΔ

-Δημήτρη Παπαλεξόπουλο, Διευθύνοντα Σύμβουλο της Τιτάν
Σύμφωνα με το bilderbergmeetings.org, η τελική λίστα των 125 συμμετεχόντων έχει ως εξής:

Castries, Henri de (FRA), Chairman and CEO, AXA Group

Aboutaleb, Ahmed (NLD), Mayor, City of Rotterdam

Achleitner, Paul M. (DEU), Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Deutsche Bank AG

Agius, Marcus (GBR), Chairman, PA Consulting Group

Ahrenkiel, Thomas (DNK), Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence

Albuquerque, Maria Luís (PRT), Former Minister of Finance; MP, Social Democratic Party

Alierta, César (ESP), Executive Chairman and CEO, Telefónica

Altman, Roger C. (USA), Executive Chairman, Evercore

[expander_maker more=”Διαβάστε περισσότερα” less=”Διαβάστε λιγότερα”]Altman, Sam (USA), President, Y Combinator

Andersson, Magdalena (SWE), Minister of Finance

Applebaum, Anne (USA), Columnist Washington Post; Director of the Transitions Forum, Legatum Institute

Apunen, Matti (FIN), Director, Finnish Business and Policy Forum EVA

Aydin-Düzgit, Senem (TUR), Associate Professor and Jean Monnet Chair, Istanbul Bilgi University

Barbizet, Patricia (FRA), CEO, Artemis

Barroso, José M. Durão (PRT), Former President of the European Commission

Baverez, Nicolas (FRA), Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher

Bengio, Yoshua (CAN), Professor in Computer Science and Operations Research, University of Montreal

Benko, René (AUT), Founder and Chairman of the Advisory Board, SIGNA Holding GmbH

Bernabè, Franco (ITA), Chairman, CartaSi S.p.A.

Beurden, Ben van (NLD), CEO, Royal Dutch Shell plc

Blanchard, Olivier (FRA), Fred Bergsten Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute

Botín, Ana P. (ESP), Executive Chairman, Banco Santander

Brandtzæg, Svein Richard (NOR), President and CEO, Norsk Hydro ASA

Breedlove, Philip M. (INT), Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe

Brende, Børge (NOR), Minister of Foreign Affairs

Burns, William J. (USA), President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Cebrián, Juan Luis (ESP), Executive Chairman, PRISA and El País

Charpentier, Emmanuelle (FRA), Director, Max Planck Institute for Infection Biology

Coeuré, Benoît (INT), Member of the Executive Board, European Central Bank

Costamagna, Claudio (ITA), Chairman, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti S.p.A.

Cote, David M. (USA), Chairman and CEO, Honeywell

Cryan, John (DEU), CEO, Deutsche Bank AG

Dassù, Marta (ITA), Senior Director, European Affairs, Aspen Institute

Dijksma, Sharon A.M. (NLD), Minister for the Environment

Döpfner, Mathias (DEU), CEO, Axel Springer SE

Dyvig, Christian (DNK), Chairman, Kompan

Ebeling, Thomas (DEU), CEO, ProSiebenSat.1

Elkann, John (ITA), Chairman and CEO, EXOR; Chairman, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles

Enders, Thomas (DEU), CEO, Airbus Group

Engel, Richard (USA), Chief Foreign Correspondent, NBC News

Fabius, Laurent (FRA), President, Constitutional Council

Federspiel, Ulrik (DNK), Group Executive, Haldor Topsøe A/S

Ferguson, Jr., Roger W. (USA), President and CEO, TIAA

Ferguson, Niall (USA), Professor of History, Harvard University

Flint, Douglas J. (GBR), Group Chairman, HSBC Holdings plc

Garicano, Luis (ESP), Professor of Economics, LSE; Senior Advisor to Ciudadanos

Georgieva, Kristalina (INT), Vice President, European Commission

Gernelle, Etienne (FRA), Editorial Director, Le Point

Gomes da Silva, Carlos (PRT), Vice Chairman and CEO, Galp Energia

Goodman, Helen (GBR), MP, Labour Party

Goulard, Sylvie (INT), Member of the European Parliament

Graham, Lindsey (USA), Senator

Grillo, Ulrich (DEU), Chairman, Grillo-Werke AG; President, Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie

Gruber, Lilli (ITA), Editor-in-Chief and Anchor “Otto e mezzo”, La7 TV

Hadfield, Chris (CAN), Colonel, Astronaut

Halberstadt, Victor (NLD), Professor of Economics, Leiden University

Harding, Dido (GBR), CEO, TalkTalk Telecom Group plc

Hassabis, Demis (GBR), Co-Founder and CEO, DeepMind

Hobson, Mellody (USA), President, Ariel Investment, LLC

Hoffman, Reid (USA), Co-Founder and Executive Chairman, LinkedIn

Höttges, Timotheus (DEU), CEO, Deutsche Telekom AG

Jacobs, Kenneth M. (USA), Chairman and CEO, Lazard

Jäkel, Julia (DEU), CEO, Gruner + Jahr

Johnson, James A. (USA), Chairman, Johnson Capital Partners

Jonsson, Conni (SWE), Founder and Chairman, EQT

Jordan, Jr., Vernon E. (USA), Senior Managing Director, Lazard Frères & Co. LLC

Kaeser, Joe (DEU), President and CEO, Siemens AG

Karp, Alex (USA), CEO, Palantir Technologies

Kengeter, Carsten (DEU), CEO, Deutsche Börse AG

Kerr, John (GBR), Deputy Chairman, Scottish Power

Kherbache, Yasmine (BEL), MP, Flemish Parliament

Kissinger, Henry A. (USA), Chairman, Kissinger Associates, Inc.

Kleinfeld, Klaus (USA), Chairman and CEO, Alcoa

Kravis, Henry R. (USA), Co-Chairman and Co-CEO, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.

Kravis, Marie-Josée (USA), Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute

Kudelski, André (CHE), Chairman and CEO, Kudelski Group

Lagarde, Christine (INT), Managing Director, International Monetary Fund

Levin, Richard (USA), CEO, Coursera

Leyen, Ursula von der (DEU), Minister of Defence

Leysen, Thomas (BEL), Chairman, KBC Group

Logothetis, George (GRC), Chairman and CEO, Libra Group

Maizière, Thomas de (DEU), Minister of the Interior, Federal Ministry of the Interior

Makan, Divesh (USA), CEO, ICONIQ Capital

Malcomson, Scott (USA), Author; President, Monere Ltd.

Markwalder, Christa (CHE), President of the National Council and the Federal Assembly

McArdle, Megan (USA), Columnist, Bloomberg View

Michel, Charles (BEL), Prime Minister

Micklethwait, John (USA), Editor-in-Chief, Bloomberg LP

Minton Beddoes, Zanny (GBR), Editor-in-Chief, The Economist

Mitsotakis, Kyriakos (GRC), President, New Democracy Party

Morneau, Bill (CAN), Minister of Finance

Mundie, Craig J. (USA), Principal, Mundie & Associates

Murray, Charles A. (USA), W.H. Brady Scholar, American Enterprise Institute

Netherlands, H.M. the King of the (NLD)

Noonan, Michael (IRL), Minister for Finance

Noonan, Peggy (USA), Author, Columnist, The Wall Street Journal

O’Leary, Michael (IRL), CEO, Ryanair Plc

Ollongren, Kajsa (NLD), Deputy Mayor of Amsterdam

Özel, Soli (TUR), Professor, Kadir Has University

Papalexopoulos, Dimitri (GRC), CEO, Titan Cement Co.

Petraeus, David H. (USA), Chairman, KKR Global Institute

Philippe, Edouard (FRA), Mayor of Le Havre

Pind, Søren (DNK), Minister of Justice

Ratti, Carlo (ITA), Director, MIT Senseable City Lab

Reisman, Heather M. (CAN), Chair and CEO, Indigo Books & Music Inc.

Rutte, Mark (NLD), Prime Minister

Sawers, John (GBR), Chairman and Partner, Macro Advisory Partners

Schäuble, Wolfgang (DEU), Minister of Finance

Schieder, Andreas (AUT), Chairman, Social Democratic Group

Schmidt, Eric E. (USA), Executive Chairman, Alphabet Inc.

Scholten, Rudolf (AUT), CEO, Oesterreichische Kontrollbank AG

Schwab, Klaus (INT), Executive Chairman, World Economic Forum

Sikorski, Radoslaw (POL), Senior Fellow, Harvard University; Former Minister of Foreign Affairs

Simsek, Mehmet (TUR), Deputy Prime Minister

Sinn, Hans-Werner (DEU), Professor for Economics and Public Finance, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich

Skogen Lund, Kristin (NOR), Director General, The Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise

Standing, Guy (GBR), Co-President, BIEN; Research Professor, University of London

Svanberg, Carl-Henric (SWE), Chairman, BP plc and AB Volvo

Thiel, Peter A. (USA), President, Thiel Capital

Tillich, Stanislaw (DEU), Minister-President of Saxony

Vetterli, Martin (CHE), President, NSF

Wahlroos, Björn (FIN), Chairman, Sampo Group, Nordea Bank, UPM-Kymmene Corporation

Wallenberg, Jacob (SWE), Chairman, Investor AB

Weder di Mauro, Beatrice (CHE), Professor of Economics, University of Mainz

Wolf, Martin H. (GBR), Chief Economics Commentator, Financial Times
Πηγή:link[/expander_maker]

9
Jun

DEUTSCHE BANK: The ECB is on course to destroy the eurozone

DEUTSCHE BANK: The ECB is on course to destroy the eurozone.The European Central Bank risks tearing the eurozone apart for the sake “of short-term financial stability,” and the ECB needs to reverse course before it is too late, says Deutsche Bank.

A new note from the bank’s group chief economist, David Folkerts-Landau, says that the ECB has gone badly off course and needs to correct itself before it makes some “catastrophic” mistakes.

That correction should come, Deutsche argues, in the form of abandoning the bank’s negative interest rate policy (NIRP) and stopping the mass bond-buying it has undertaken in recent years.

President Mario Draghi and other senior staff at the ECB are already causing the central bank to lose credibility in both the markets and with the general public, and is hurting savers, says the bank. Here’s the quote (emphasis ours):

[expander_maker more=”Διαβάστε περισσότερα” less=”Διαβάστε λιγότερα”]Already it is clear that lower and lower interest rates and ever larger purchases are confronting the law of decreasing returns. What is more, the ECB has lost credibility within markets and more worryingly among the public.

But the ECB’s response is to push policy to further extremes. This causes mis-allocations in the real economy that become increasingly hard to reverse without even greater pain. Savers lose, while stock and apartment owners rejoice.

Worse, by appointing itself the eurozone’s “whatever it takes” saviour of last resort, the ECB has allowed politicians to sit on their hands with regard to growth-enhancing reforms and necessary fiscal consolidation.

Thereby ECB policy is threatening the European project as a whole for the sake of short-term financial stability.

In 12 pages of damning analysis, Germany’s biggest lender attacks the ECB’s policies, and compares the bank’s mistakes to those made by the German Reichsbank, and the US Federal Reserve in the 1920s, which eventually helped lead the US into the Great Depression.

“That was a hundred years ago but mistakes keep happening despite all the supposed improvements to central banking, from independence to better data and more sophisticated theoretical and econometric models,” the report says.

Here’s one of the key passages from the note, explaining why Deutsche Bank believes the ECB needs to change its course (emphasis ours):

When reducing interest rates to levels not seen in twenty generations failed to stimulate growth and inflation, the ECB embarked on a massive programme of purchasing eurozone member debt – quantitative easing. But the sellers of sovereign debt to ECB did not spend or invest their proceeds, the money just ended back at the central bank.

So the ECB went to the logical extreme: it imposed negative interest rates on deposits. Currently almost half of eurozone sovereign debt is trading with a negative yield. At the same time the ECB underwrites the solvency of its members as purchaser of last resort of sovereign debt – the so-called OMT programme.

All of which has – in our view – tilted the balance of trade-offs towards changing direction as soon as possible. The benefits from ever-looser policy are diminishing while the litany of distortions, perversions and disincentives grows by the day.Savers are punished and speculators rewarded. Bad companies survive while good companies are too scared to invest.

Deutsche also points out that, according to data from Eurobarometer, trust in the ECB is now the lowest it has been since the start of the millennium, less than two years after the bank came into existence. Here’s Deutsche’s chart, showing just that:

ECB trustDeutsche Bank

Later in the report, Folkerts-Landau echoes the opinion of fellow German, finance minister Wolfgang Schauble in arguing that ECB policy has helped to give rise to extremist political groups like the anti-Islamic Alternative for Germany party, and the Austrian Freedom Party, whose presidential candidate Norbert Hofer was a whisker away from winning the country’s presidential election in May. “The longer policy prevents the necessary catharsis, the more it contributes to the growth of populist or extremist politics,” Deutsche’s top economist argues.

He also accuses central bankers, including president Draghi of taking part in “group-think” that is further clouding the bank’s judgment about effective monetary policy. Here’s the key quote (emphasis ours):

In the case of the world’s central bankers, strongly held views are then reinforced by group-think. It is no surprise therefore that ECB president Mario Draghi defends his policy by saying that all other major central banks are doing the same – which by the way does not hold for negative rates. And of course, if a problem persists – such as inflation undershooting yet again – this can only be due to further demand shortcomings rather than other factors such as an oil price shock.

Deutsche Bank’s damning indictment of the ECB’s performance comes on the same day as reports that another of Germany’s biggest lenders, Commerzbank, is considering storing cash in its own vaults to avoid paying for storage thanks to the ECB’s negative interest rates.If that does happen, it would likely be seen as a huge vote of no confidence for the ECB.

 

Source:link[/expander_maker]

9
Jun

Financial Times: Βελτιωμένα οικονομικά στοιχεία στην Ελλάδα – Ο μόνος δρόμος είναι προς τα πάνω

Financial Times: Βελτιωμένα οικονομικά στοιχεία στην Ελλάδα – Ο μόνος δρόμος είναι προς τα πάνω.Η Financial Times επισημαίνει, ότι τα στοιχεία που δόθηκαν από την ΕΛΣΤΑΤ είναι ακόμη άσχημα, αλλά βελτιωμένα σε σχέση με τα προηγούμενα.

Στην βελτίωση των στοιχείων για την ανεργία, την βιομηχανική παραγωγή και τον δείκτη τιμών καταναλωτή στην Ελλάδα, που έδωσε στην δημοσιότητα η ΕΛΣΤΑΤ, επικεντρώνει η Financial Times, η οποία σχολιάζει, ότι τα δεδομένα είναι ακόμα άσχημα, αλλά προσθέτει ότι ” η πρόοδος είναι πρόοδος”.
Το δημοσίευμα δίνει έμφαση στην ανεργία, η οποία διαμορφώθηκε στο 24,1% τον Μάρτιο, χαρακτηρίζοντας ως θετικό, μόνο το γεγονός ότι βρίσκεται πλέον σε ένα χαμηλό 4 ετών.
Όσον αφορά στη βιομηχανική παραγωγή, η εφημερίδα αναφέρει ότι επεκτάθηκε κατά 2,8% σε ετήσια βάση τον Απρίλιο, επισημαίνοντας ότι πρόκειται για σημαντική βελτίωση σε σχέση με την συρρίκνωση κατά 4% που είχε καταγραφεί τον Μάρτιο.
Σχετικά με τις τιμές καταναλωτή, η Financial Times τονίζει, ότι ο αποπληθωρισμός αποτελεί μια μάστιγα για την ελληνική οικονομία τα τελευταία χρόνια, σημειώνοντας ότι το θετικό είναι, πως το ποσοστό του αποπληθωρισμού επιβραδύνθηκε για δεύτερο συνεχή μήνα τον Μάιο στο -0,2% από -0,4% που ήταν τον Απρίλιο.
Πηγή:link
9
Jun

Αχτίδα φωτός στα κόκκινα δάνεια βλέπει η Moody’s

Αχτίδα φωτός στα κόκκινα δάνεια βλέπει η Moody’s.Αισιοδοξία εκπέμπουν τα αποτελέσματα των συστημικών τραπεζών, σύμφωνα με τον οίκο αξιολόγησης. Η σημασία των αυξημένων προβλέψεων και της μείωσης του σχηματισμού νέων προβληματικών δανείων. Το μήνυμα προς την κυβέρνηση.

Τα αποτελέσματα πρώτου εξαμήνου των τεσσάρων συστημικών τραπεζών δείχνουν ότι η δημιουργία νέων μη εξυπηρετούμενων δανείων (NPLs) υποχωρεί για δεύτερο συνεχόμενο τρίμηνο, τονίζει ο οίκος αξιολόγησης σε ανάλυσή του.

Χαρακτηρίζει «credit positive» τα αποτελέσματα, καθώς δείχνουν επίσης μείωση των προβλέψεων, κάτι που θα βοηθήσει τις τράπεζες να επιστρέψουν σε κερδοφορία μετά από πολλά τρίμηνα απωλειών.

Τα συνολικά στοιχεία για τα NPLs (δάνεια σε καθυστέρηση άνω των 90 ημερών) δείχνουν ότι μειώθηκαν κατά 400 εκατ. ευρώ μεταξύ Δεκεμβρίου 2015 και Μαρτίου 2016 με την Eurobank και την Πειραιώς να εμφανίζουν αρνητικό σχηματισμό NPLs περίπου 2% σε τριμηνία μέτρηση. Αυτό έχει θετικό αντίκτυπο στους ισολογισμούς των τραπεζών με 71% μείωση στις προβλέψεις σε τριμηνιαία βάση, καθώς ΕΤΕ και Πειραιώς παρουσίασαν μείωση 79% έκαστη.

Όπως σημειώνει η Moody’s οι προβλέψεις αυξήθηκαν το 2015 ως αποτέλεσμα της απαίτησης της ΕΚΤ να καλυφθούν οι ανάγκες που προέκυψαν από το AQR (Asset Quality Review).

 

[expander_maker more=”Διαβάστε περισσότερα” less=”Διαβάστε λιγότερα”]Ο οίκος αξιολόγησης σημειώνει ότι το σύνολο των κόκκινων δανείων για τις τέσσερις συστημικές τράπεζες μειώθηκε στα 85,2 δισ. ευρώ από περίπου 86 δισ. ευρώ. Η μείωση αυτή αντανακλά τον περιορισμό του σχηματισμού νέων προβληματικών δανείων και την σημαντική διαγραφή προβληματικών χορηγήσεων.

Οι προβλέψεις, σημειώνει, αποτέλεσαν μεγάλο βάρος για τους ισολογισμούς των τραπεζών τα τελευταία χρόνια και «ανάλωσαν» περίπου το 86% των προ προβλέψεων κέρδη το Μάρτιο του 2016. Ως αποτέλεσμα οι τράπεζες αύξησαν την κάλυψη NPLs στο 68% τον περασμένο Μάρτιο από 58% ένα χρόνο νωρίτερα περιορίζοντας τα «πτωτικά ρίσκα» στην κεφαλαιακή τους βάση.

Η Moody’s εκτιμά ότι θα μειωθεί η τάση, τόσο στο σχηματισμό κόκκινων δανείων, όσο και στις προβλέψεις σε όλο το 2016 και αυτό θα έχει θετικό αντίκτυπο στους ισολογισμούς.

Η διαχείριση των προβληματικών δανείων είναι βασική προτεραιότητα για τις τράπεζες φέτος. Τον Μάιο ηAlpha Bank ΑΛΦΑ +0,85% και η Eurobank ανακοίνωσαν τη συμφωνία με την KKR για να δημιουργηθεί μια κοινή πλατφόρμα που θα διαχειρίζεται η Pillarstone για να διαχειριστεί την έκθεση σε προβληματικά δάνεια. Μετά την επιτυχή ολοκλήρωση της πρώτης αξιολόγησης, που θα συμβάλει στην περαιτέρω αποκατάσταση της εμπιστοσύνης στην Ελλάδα, ο οίκος εκτιμά ότι θα υπάρξουν και άλλα ανάλογα ντιλ φέτος με άλλες τράπεζες.

Παρά ταύτα, καταλήγει, το ακόμα σημαντικό ύψος των NPLs στους ισολογισμούς των τραπεζών, περίπου 37% του συνόλου, παραμένει η μεγαλύτερη πρόκληση. Περιμένουμε ότι μια σημαντική μείωση θα απαιτήσει τουλάχιστον 3-4 χρόνια, παρότι αυτό εξαρτάται από την ικανότητα της ελληνικής κυβέρνησης να ολοκληρώσει έγκαιρα τις αξιολογήσεις του προγράμματος στήριξης. Αυτό θα μειώσει το ρίσκο πολιτικών και δημοσιονομικών κρίσεων, κάτι που θα έχει σημαντικές αρνητικές συνέπειες στην «όρεξη» ξένων funds να αγοράσουν ή να διαχειριστούν προβληματικά δάνεια στην Ελλάδα.

Πηγή:link[/expander_maker]

9
Jun

Ανοδος 2,8% στη βιομηχανική παραγωγή

Ανοδος 2,8% στη βιομηχανική παραγωγή τον Απρίλιο σε σύγκριση με τον αντίστοιχο Δείκτη του Απριλίου 2015, και έναντι αύξησης 0,5% που σημειώθηκε κατά την αντίστοιχη σύγκριση του έτους 2015 προς το 2014.

Σύμφωνα με ανακοίνωση της ΕΛΣΤΑΤ, ο μέσος Δείκτης Βιομηχανικής Παραγωγής της περιόδου Ιανουαρίου – Απριλίου 2016, σε σύγκριση με τον αντίστοιχο Δείκτη της περιόδου Ιανουαρίου – Απριλίου 2015, παρουσίασε αύξηση κατά 0,2%, έναντι αύξησης 2,0% που σημειώθηκε κατά την αντίστοιχη σύγκριση του έτους 2015 προς το 2014.

Ο εποχικά διορθωμένος ως προς την επίδραση μηνιαίων γεγονότων (π.χ. εορτές, τουριστική περίοδος κ.λ.π) Γενικός Δείκτης Βιομηχανικής Παραγωγής του μηνός Απριλίου 2016, σε σύγκριση με τον αντίστοιχο Δείκτη του Μαρτίου 2016, παρουσίασε αύξηση κατά 4,0%.

 

Πηγή:link

9
Jun

ΕΛΣΤΑΤ: Στο 24,1% η ανεργία τον Μάρτιο από 25,7% πέρυσι

ΕΛΣΤΑΤ: Στο 24,1% η ανεργία τον Μάρτιο από 25,7% πέρυσι.Το εποχικά διορθωμένο ποσοστό ανεργίας τον Μάρτιο του 2016 ανήλθε σε 24,1% έναντι 25,7% τον Μάρτιο του 2015 και έναντι 24,2% τον Φεβρουάριο του 2016.

Όπως αναφέρει η ΕΛΣΤΑΤ, το σύνολο των απασχολουμένων, κατά τον Μάρτιο του 2016, εκτιμάται
ότι ανήλθε σε 3.623.234 άτομα. Οι άνεργοι ανήλθαν σε 1.153.232 άτομα ενώ ο οικονομικά μη ενεργός πληθυσμός ανήλθε σε 3.281.503 άτομα.

Οι απασχολούμενοι αυξήθηκαν κατά 87.296 άτομα σε σχέση με τον Μάρτιο του 2015 (αύξηση 2,5%) και κατά 1.632 άτομα σε σχέση με τον Φεβρουάριο του 2016.

Οι άνεργοι μειώθηκαν κατά 68.045 άτομα σε σχέση με τον Μάρτιο του 2015 (μείωση 5,6%) και κατά 4.609 άτομα σε σχέση με τον Φεβρουάριο του 2016 (μείωση 0,4%).

Οι οικονομικά μη ενεργοί, δηλαδή τα άτομα που δεν εργάζονται ούτε αναζητούν εργασία, μειώθηκαν
κατά 60.549 άτομα σε σχέση με τον Μάρτιο του 2015 (μείωση 1,8%) και κατά 192 άτομα σε σχέση με τον Φεβρουάριο του 2016.

Συνεχίστηκε το Μάιο ο αποπληθωρισμός

Μείωση 0,9% κατέγραψε ο Γενικός Δείκτης Τιμών Καταναλωτή το Μάιο του 2016, προς τον
αντίστοιχο ?είκτη του Μαΐου 2015, έναντι µείωσης 2,1%, που σηµειώθηκε κατά την αντίστοιχη
σύγκριση του έτους 2015 προς το 2014, σύμφωνα με την Ελληνική Στατιστική Αρχή.

Ο Γενικός Δείκτης κατά τον µήνα Μάιο 2016 σε σύγκριση µε τον Απρίλιο 2016, παρουσίασε µείωση
0,4%, έναντι µείωσης 0,8%, που σηµειώθηκε κατά την αντίστοιχη σύγκριση του προηγούµενου
έτους.

Ο µέσος δείκτης του δωδεκαµήνου Ιουνίου 2015 – Μαΐου 2016 σε σύγκριση προς τον ίδιο Δείκτη του
δωδεκαµήνου Ιουνίου 2014 – Μαΐου 2015 παρουσίασε µείωση 1,2%, έναντι µείωσης 1,7%, που σηµειώθηκε κατά το αντίστοιχο προηγούµενο δωδεκάµηνο.

 

Πηγή: capital

9
Jun

On the importance of policy alignment to fulfil our economic potential

On the importance of policy alignment to fulfil our economic potential.Ιn a speech in Vienna last week, I explained why monetary policy could deliver the appropriate level of stimulus to the economy, even in a setting where interest rates are close to their effective lower bound.[1] As inflation is ultimately a monetary phenomenon, a committed central bank can always fulfil its mandate. And that is true independently of the stance of other macroeconomic policies.

But monetary policy does not exist in a vacuum. The situation of central banks is better described as independence in interdependence, since other policies matter a great deal. They can buttress or dilute the effects of our policy. They can slow down or speed up the return to stability. And they can determine whether stability is accompanied by prosperity, which is directly relevant to the social cohesion of the euro area.

It is these interactions, and why they matter, that I would like to talk about today.

Policy interactions in stabilising the economy

The objective of the ECB is defined as delivering a rate of inflation below but close to 2% over the medium term. But the medium term is not a fixed period of time. When faced with adverse shocks, the pace at which monetary policy can bring inflation back to the objective depends on two factors: the nature of the shock itself, and the conditions in which monetary policy operates.

 

[expander_maker more=”Διαβάστε περισσότερα” less=”Διαβάστε λιγότερα”]Some types of disturbance will inevitably depress inflation for longer than others and make the return to the objective slower. The recent succession of global oil supply shocks is a prime example. In that context, the job of monetary policy is not to fight short-term shocks to prices, but to prevent them from feeding into longer-term inflation dynamics – or put another way, it is to make sure that the effect of shocks on inflation is no more persistent than it needs to be. So when we talk about returning inflation to our objective without undue delay, this is what we mean. The return to price stability should take no longer than implied by the nature of the shocks we are facing.

But this is not entirely dependent on our actions, due to the second factor – the conditions in which we operate. Monetary policy can act decisively to support demand, to stabilise inflation expectations and to avert second round effects on wages and prices, which is exactly what the ECB has done over the past two years.[2] But the orientation of other policies also influences the speed with which output returns to potential. So if other policies are not aligned with monetary policy, inflation risks returning to our objective at a slower pace.

There are a number of policy areas that matter in this regard.

First, for monetary policy to stoke demand and inflation, it matters crucially whether the financial system is able to relay our policy impulses efficiently to the economy. In the euro area that transmission mechanism has been impeded repeatedly in the past, initially by rising risk premia linked to unwarranted fears about the survival of the euro area, and later by widespread bank deleveraging.[3] That has diluted the effectiveness of our stimulus and lengthened the “long and variable” lags over which monetary policy works.

We have compensated for this by designing our measures to remove transmission blockages, as well as including an asset quality review in the comprehensive assessment of bank balance sheets that we launched in 2013. Both measures have helped ease financing conditions, as we can see in our bank lending surveys. But bank balance sheets have not yet been fully repaired, as illustrated by the high stock of non-performing loans in some parts of the euro area. So more work-out of these non-performing assets will have to take place, and the conditions for that will have to be put in place by the right policies and authorities.

Second, it matters for monetary policy whether fiscal policy is steering aggregate demand in the same direction, and how strongly. Fiscal policy was contractionary for several years in the euro area following the loss of confidence in sovereign credit in 2010, and the negative effect on growth was exacerbated by the fact that consolidation in some countries was implemented mainly through tax rises rather than current spending cuts.[4] This placed the full burden of macroeconomic stabilisation on monetary policy. And in a context of disrupted transmission, that has led to a slower return of output to potential than if fiscal policy had been more supportive.

This is why the ECB has said many times that fiscal policy should work with not against monetary policy, and the aggregate fiscal stance in the euro area is now slightly expansionary. But supporting demand is not just a question of the budget balance, but also of its composition, especially the tax burden and the share of public investment. So we should not see fiscal policy as solely a macroeconomic tool, which is only available to countries with strong public finances. We should also see it as a microeconomic policy tool that can enhance growth even when public finances need to be consolidated.

Third, it matters for monetary policy whether the right structural policies are in place. Structural reforms can help limit the depth and duration of shocks, which in turn supports the anchoring of inflation expectations and keeps real interest rates low.[5]Such reforms can also reduce the transmission lag of our measures, since a more flexible, more responsive economy is likely to transmit monetary policy impulses faster.[6] And they produce higher potential growth, which leads to higher investment and hence a higher equilibrium real rate. That creates the conditions for the central bank to return to conventional interest rate policy as the means to deliver price stability.

In the euro area, many structural reforms have been implemented in recent years, and especially in those countries worst-hit by the crisis. The benefits can now be seen. But there are many more benefits still to aim for, and so much more needs to be done.

Finally, uncertainty over the institutional stability of the euro area also matters for monetary policy, since it too can slow down the transmission of monetary policy. Firms that lack sufficient visibility over their operating environment over the years to come may understandably choose to deter or even abandon investment plans. That is especially so when the return on those investments depends strongly on the size and openness of the market provided by the euro area and the European Union. This has been clear in the past when the future of the euro area has been called into question.

And that sort of uncertainty not only impacts on firms that borrow to finance real investment. It can also affect the saving rate of firms and households, as the perception of higher risk can call for higher precautionary savings. This would obviously run against the efforts of monetary policy to stimulate higher investment and consumption.

So I will only note once more the critical need to restore clarity and confidence on the institutional setup of the euro area. We know that the current setup is incomplete. There is a large degree of agreement on what its shortcomings are, and many proposals have been put forward on how to overcome them. Progress in this field is necessary for the long-term, but it is also relevant for the short-term because of its effect on investment. Indeed, perhaps the best way to raise output today is to remove the drag on confidence that results from such uncertainties.

Summing up, there is a large degree of interaction between monetary policy and other policies that may in principle be geared towards different objectives. Such interactions do not prevent a determined central bank from achieving its objective. But they do affect the time frame over which we can do so. What this implies is that, for stabilisation to occur no more slowly than is strictly necessary, all policy areas have a role to play.

And in fact, all policymakers should have a strong motivation to do so, because time matters. A too-slow return of output to potential is far from innocuous. On the contrary, it has lasting economic consequences, since it can ultimately lead to potential being eroded as well.

It is well-documented for instance that workers who remain unemployed for too long may suffer the effects throughout their life, in the form of reduced employability, reduced productivity and reduced income – so-called hysteresis.[7] That is particularly true for younger workers who are unemployed during the all-important formative years of their careers and may suffer from labour market “scarring”.[8] In the euro area structural unemployment is estimated to have risen during the crisis, while youth employment remains high.[9]

There is also emerging evidence that growing below potential for too long can erode that potential through its effect on productivity growth. When uncertainty is high, a “wait-and-see” attitude can cause the most productive firms not to expand as much as they would otherwise, and the least productive firms not to contract as much as they should.[10] In other words – and contrary to what is often claimed – too-weak demand can slow down “creative destruction”, whereas stronger demand can accelerate it. And there are signs of such effects in the euro area, too.[11]

The cost of delay, then, is that labour and productivity suffer, and the output gap closes in the “wrong way” – instead of output rising towards potential, it is potential that falls towards current output.

So it is in fact in everybody’s interest to act without undue delay. For the ECB, this means that we do not let inflation undershoot our objective for longer than is avoidable given the nature of the shocks we face. For others, it means devoting every effort to ensuring that output is returned to potential before subpar growth causes lasting damage. And given the harm that has already occurred to potential growth during the crisis, it also means acting decisively to raise potential.

While keeping output close to potential is about the right policy mix, raising potential is above all about structural reforms. This ultimately comes down to two factors – employment and productivity. And in both areas there is considerable scope for the euro area to raise output with determined reform efforts.

Raising potential growth

In terms of employment, we know that the euro area faces a long-term drag from its unfavourable demographics. But even accounting for that, I see substantial leeway to lift output in the euro area by exploiting the other margins which determine employment: first, by reducing the trend unemployment rate, which remains too high in many countries; and second, by raising participation rates, which are still short of international norms in several jurisdictions.

Reducing trend unemployment is in part about reversing the hysteresis effects I described above. But it is important to remember that the crisis only added to an already troubling picture: structural unemployment in the euro area was estimated at around 9% even going into the crisis, compared with just 5% in the US. This is a consequence of structural features of euro area labour markets which have been “ratcheting up” unemployment over successive cycles.[12] And it implies that there is a large, latent potential in the euro area labour force which can be unleashed with appropriate labour market and activation policies – and more so than in other advanced economies.

Experience during the crisis has demonstrated how such reforms can work. Reforms implemented by Portugal under its adjustment programme are estimated to have reduced the unemployment rate by around 3 percentage points over the 2011-2014 period.[13] Likewise, the Spanish labour market reform in 2012 has been a factor supporting employment growth since then.[14] This should give encouragement to reforming countries to continue their efforts – and in particular those where high unemployment has persisted for so long that it has been allowed to become a social norm.

But the challenge is not just moving people from unemployment into employment, it is also raising the size of the workforce – which is where participation comes in. Though the euro area fares quite well in international comparisons, participation rates in some Member States remain relatively low, with a roughly 15 percentage point difference between the best and worst performers. This implies that there is also a latent potential to raise employment on this margin with the right structural policies. For example, we have seen participation rates of older workers grow strongly during the crisis, due in part to pension reforms adopted in many euro area countries.[15]

Still, despite this untapped reserve for accelerating employment growth, we cannot avoid the fact that, over time, the inherent speed limits resulting from the euro area’s unfavourable demographics will start to bite. The euro area’s working age population is projected to start gradually decreasing in the next decade. In that context, employment growth is likely to start decelerating in the not-too-distant future, even with determined structural reforms, as a higher share of people in work will no longer be able to offset the fall in working age population. Even higher expected migration is unlikely to be able to fully offset this natural population decline.[16]

Public policy can certainly help temper these effects through its role in receiving and integrating migrants. But since policy cannot do much to alter long run demographic trends, the implication is that raising long-term growth will require a complement – namely, raising productivity.

Raising productivity is difficult. It requires a broader set of reforms, and those reforms typically encounter greater resistance from vested interests. That is why many countries have found it easier to reform the labour market than other areas during the crisis, and indeed repeated attempts since the turn of century to make the Europe “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” have produced only meagre results.[17] Given the weak outlook for euro area growth, however, tackling the productivity challenge can no longer be delayed.

Broadly speaking, productivity growth comes through two channels. The first is within-firm growth, which depends on the generation and diffusion of new innovations and management techniques. The second is across-firm growth, which depends on the movement of resources from the least to the most productive firms. The euro area’s comparatively weak performance derives from both.

Indicators on research and development suggest that the euro area is lagging behind in terms of innovative capacity, and particularly in the services sector. Indeed, the diffusion of information and communication technology appears to have contributed much less to services productivity growth than in the US, and this accounts for much of the weaker productivity performance of the euro area since the mid-1990s.[18]

At the same time, employment in euro area is undergoing a secular shift from manufacturing to services, and this has only been exacerbated by the patterns of job creation since the crisis.[19] Such shifts are of course taking place in all advanced economies. But since productivity growth in the services sector is often lower in the euro area, it constrains our aggregate productivity more.

Yet this picture is not necessarily a cause for pessimism.

For a start, it suggests that there is quite some scope for productivity catch-up through adopting digital technologies. So the debate that is currently raging among US economists about whether the great waves of technological innovation are now over is, for the time being, less relevant.[20] For the euro area the key question is how to create the conditions for more firms to move towards the productivity frontier.

What is more, the secular shift from manufacturing to services can be consistent with higher productivity if resources are well allocated. In fact, there are very large differences between the most and least productive firms within each sector, even more so than across sectors.[21] This implies that, even in a services-oriented economy, aggregate productivity can still be by improved.

So the euro area faces a twin policy challenge: to get more firms in each sector to the productivity frontier, and to get more labour and capital to those productive firms. And crucially, this would not only boost output, but also employment and wage equality, since labour would be concentrating in firms that are both growing and demanding higher value skills.

To achieve this there are, in my view, three policy priorities.

First is addressing the structural barriers to knowledge diffusion within Europe. This has many facets, but critical are policies that increase trade openness and facilitate firms’ participation in value chains, as well as a competitive business environment that favours the adoption of superior managerial practices and organisational structures.[22] The most powerful “quick win” we could make here would be to complete the single market, especially in services, since that would automatically accelerate diffusion from the European frontier where we already have many world leading industries.[23]

For firms to integrate effectively into the single market, however, they need to be able to scale, which is why the second priority is to create the conditions for the most productive firms to expand quickly and attract resources. This depends on well-functioning product and labour markets, a financial system that channels capital to dynamic firms, and policies that prevent resources from becoming trapped in unproductive firms, such as efficient judicial systems and bankruptcy laws. Change of that nature creates opportunities, but it can also be perceived as threatening for individual workers. So adequate social safety nets have to be in place, too.

That is also why the third priority is improving human capital. This would benefit workers who would gain higher pay due to better-matched skills. And it would benefit productive firms by reducing the skill mismatch that constrains their growth.[24] Making progress in this area comes down primarily to education, but labour market reforms, such as lifelong learning schemes and removing labour market dualities, could also make an important contribution – for instance, by providing greater opportunities for both younger and mature workers to gain experience and access training, both of which help raise their individual productivity.

Ultimately, investing in human capital is the key ingredient in making growth both stronger and more inclusive. And over time such investment would help the euro area not just to converge to the productivity frontier, but also to shift it out.

Each country of course has its own challenges. But few euro area countries are displaying high productivity growth, so there is little doubt that progress could be made almost everywhere. That is one reason why the recent Five Presidents’ Report called for a new convergence process among euro area countries, which would move all countries towards best practices on structural reforms.[25] What is now crucial is that we move towards a common consensus on what the necessary reforms are, howcountries should implement them, and then, that the process starts.

Conclusion

There are many understandable political reasons to delay structural reform, but there are few good economic ones. The cost of delay is simply too high.

Given the interactions between policies that I have described, it is in everyone’s interest that the various strands of policy buttress each other – if only because that would shorten the time it takes for each to produce its effects. And that would mean that we can bring growth back to potential before potential itself becomes damaged.

Of all the ways to accelerate the realisation of our economic potential, perhaps the simplest is to remove the uncertainties that hamper long-term decisions and hold back investment. And speaking here in Brussels, I can only underline in this context the costs of postponing the reform of EU and euro area governance that all agree is necessary, and by the same token, the boost to prosperity and stability that would result from removing those uncertainties, without undue delay.

Source:link[/expander_maker]

Comodo SSL

Τα cookies επιτρέπουν μια σειρά από λειτουργίες που ενισχύουν την απόλαυση του bestinsurance.gr. Χρησιμοποιώντας αυτόν τον ιστότοπο, συμφωνείτε με τη χρήση των cookies, σύμφωνα με τις οδηγίες μας Περισσότερες πληροφορίες

Κανένα προσωπικό στοιχείο Χρήστη δε συλλέγεται εφόσον πρόκειται για απλή περιήγηση στον διαδικτυακό μας τόπο. (Για την απλή περιήγηση στον διαδικτυακό μας τόπο, δεν συλλέγεται κανένα προσωπικό στοιχείο του Χρήστη.) Κατά την εγγραφή στην ηλεκτρονική πλατφόρμα σχολιασμού ζητείται από τους Χρήστες η παροχή προσωπικών στοιχείων, τα οποία τηρούνται για λόγους ασφαλείας, όπως προβλέπει ο νόμος. (Τα στοιχεία που δίδονται από τους χρήστες κατά την εγγραφή στην ηλεκτρονική πλατφόρμα σχολιασμού τηρούνται μόνο για λόγους ασφαλείας, σύμφωνα με τις διατάξεις του νόμου.) Cookies και διεύθυνση IP Κατά τη διάρκεια της επίσκεψης σας στις ιστοσελίδες μας ο υπολογιστής σας λαμβάνει ένα μικρό αρχείο, που ονομάζεται cookie. Το cookie αποθηκεύεται στον υπολογιστή ή τη συσκευή που χρησιμοποιείτε για να σερφάρετε στο διαδίκτυο. Όταν επισκέπτεστε μία από σας ιστοσελίδες σας δέχεστε στον υπολογιστή σας ένα ή περισσότερα cookies. Το cookie είναι ένα μικρό αρχείο το οποίο τοποθετείται στον υπολογιστή ή τη συσκευή σας με την οποία περιηγείστε στο διαδίκτυο

Close